

00630

1962/10/23

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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M

Action
SS

Control: 17360

Rec'd: October 23, 1962

Info

FROM: New Delhi

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PAR/DC/MR

TO: Secretary of State

REVIEWED BY: *JB King Jr*DATE: *24*

NO: 1334, October 23, 6 P.M.

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TS authority to:

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 1334, INFORMATION USUN PRIORITY 65

ELITE EYES ONLY

Reference: Department telegrams 1605 and circular 703

I saw Prime Minister at noon for 45 minutes and made strongest possible case on Cuba. Before giving him documents contained reference telegrams I outlined political force of Cuban issue in US, parallel to similar installation of Communist power in Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan, effect on public opinion and in turn on administration when knowledge became general of nuclear missile installations covering eastern US-Caribbean area. I pictured action as mild as possible in circumstances and then to avoid diffusing attention pressed hard on two requests to-wit: Avoidance of adverse Indian statements which might give lead to other neutrals as well as Communists and support for UN proposals. I noted we were not wholly insensitive to Indians position vis-a-vis the Soviets but was compelled to ask that on this matter they be sensitive to our position. I then asked him to do me favor of reading both documents, having in mind that speech was as eloquent as covering letter was lousy.

Eyes only Prime Minister listened closely and then read both documents with great care taking 15 to 20 minutes to do so. He was I think impressed. He then asked some details about missiles

and I

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Reviewed by: *Elijah Kelly Jr.*Date: *2/10/92* 19

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-2- 1334, October 23, 6 P.M., from New Delhi

and I took opportunity to restate main points. Conversation then turned to Chinese border where he noted latest Chinese statement that they would no longer recognize the MacMahon Line and this gave me opportunity to affirm our general position of sympathy and support.

I will see M. J. Desai later in the day to put our needs in completely plain language. Without being completely sure I venture to think Indian position may be reasonably in hand. Having shown determination, emphasis on UN, acceptance of UN observers at sites, any other conciliatory alternatives to high seas, search and seizure obviously help our case here.

GALBRAITH

MJA

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